Global Security in the Post-Cold War Era and the Relevance of Nuclear Weapons by Bluth, Christoph
JSSA Vol. VII, No. 1                                                                                    Dr. Christoph Bluth 
70 
 
Global Security in the Post-Cold War Era and the Relevance 
of Nuclear Weapons 
Dr. Christoph Bluth1 
Abstract: 
Are nuclear weapons still relevant to global 
security? Compared with the nuclear confrontation 
in the depths of the Cold War, nuclear weapons and 
deterrence appear to have lost their salience. 
Considering the conflicts in which the major powers 
engaged, the focus in strategic studies changed to 
counterinsurgency, counterterrorism, and sub-
conventional conflict.2 Only recently, with the 
conflict in Ukraine and the increasingly 
confrontational relationship between the United 
States and China has this narrative come into 
question. The general perception on international 
security exhibits a strange paradox. On the one 
hand the US-led military interventions in 
Afghanistan, Iraq and other parts, the conflicts in 
the Middle East and Africa, the nuclearization of 
North Korea and the conflict between India and 
Pakistan among other regional security issues have 
given rise to a view that the modern world is less 
secure than ever, and we live in a world of chaos 
riven by unpredictable patterns of violence. By 
contrast, Steven Pinker has demonstrated the 
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casualties from armed conflict are at their lowest 
point in human history, and interstate warfare has 
virtually ceased to exist as a phenomenon.3 The 
imminence of a global nuclear war in which at a 
minimum hundreds of millions of people would die 
appears to have dissipated. In some respects, it 
appears that war has become almost a 
phenomenon of the past. Most of the recent 
literature on nuclear weapons has focused on 
regional crises areas, such as South Asia (India and 
Pakistan) or the Korean peninsula.4 However, the 
modernization of arsenals by the nuclear powers, 
the integration of strategic conventional and 
nuclear weapons in strategic doctrines and the 
more confrontational dynamics in Great Power 
politics is cited as evidence that the risk of nuclear 
use is increasing. This paper contests the emerging 
narratives on an increased threat of nuclear conflict 
and considers the sources of insecurity in the 
contemporary period and in particular the risks of 
armed conflict between the United States, Russia, 
and China in order to assess the role of nuclear 
weapons in contemporary security. 
 
Keywords: Nuclear Weapons, Global Security, Deterrence, US, China, 
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The transition from the first nuclear age 
The development of nuclear weapons which resulted in the acquisition 
of large strategic nuclear arsenals by the superpowers during the Cold 
War has resulted in an enormous literature elaborating the nature of 
nuclear deterrence.5 A significant consensus developed that during the 
Cold War nuclear deterrence was effective in preventing direct military 
conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union, prevented a 
large war in Europe and reduced military conflict between the 
“superpowers” to proxy conflicts in what was then called the third 
world.6  One of the most prominent advocates of the war-preventing 
effect of nuclear arsenals is Kenneth Waltz who has advocated the 
proliferation of nuclear weapons in order to reduce international 
conflict.7 The end of the Cold War was the beginning of a total 
transformation of the international system.8  
The confrontation of the two large armies of NATO and the Warsaw 
Pact that had been ready for large-scale high intensity warfare at short 
notice stood down and were to a significant degree dismantled. 9The 
strategic nuclear relationship between Russia and the United States 
changed dramatically even though the existing capabilities remained in 
place. As very large numbers of warheads were dismantled the co-
operative threat reduction programme provided for US assistance for 
                                                          
5 Lawrence Freedman and Jeffery Michaels, The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy 
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the safe and secure  dismantlement of warheads, delivery vehicles (i.e. 
missiles and missile silos) and the controlled storage of fissile materials 
(much of the uranium from Russian weapons was down blended and 
sold to the United States).10 The key change was that until the end of 
the Cold War nuclear forces were designed to provide for deterrence 
against a large-scale conventional attack and to provide for escalation 
control in the event of the outbreak of conflict. 11As the risk of major 
war in Europe became vanishingly small and Russia no longer had the 
capacity to wage such a war, the purpose of nuclear forces changed. 
They continued to provide a deterrent against a US strategic nuclear 
attack, but such a scenario likewise had become highly unlikely against a 
country that lacked the capacity of a large-scale land war, had lost a 
sizeable chunk of its territory, its Central European allies and had lost its 
foreign clients that had been involved in proxy wars.12 The unipolar 
moment had arrived, with the United States as the world’s largest 
economy with unrivalled military power and global power projection 
capabilities.13 A large strategic nuclear arsenal was the basis of Russia’s 
one remaining claim to be a Great Power, and it also provided a last 
resort guarantee of protection against foreign aggression as the 
military-industrial complex stagnated and the armed forces struggled 
to field any combat-ready units.14 
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Sources of conflict in the contemporary international system 
The expectations of the impact of the end of the Cold War on 
international security differed very substantially. President George H W 
Bush announced the dawn of a “new world order”.15 While many 
commentators decried the “international disorder” after the 
predictability of the bipolar Cold War order and realists like John 
Mearsheimer predicted that we would “soon miss the Cold War”,16 
other scholars have argued that the end of the Cold War was a much 
more substantial transition in international politics and that major war 
is becoming obsolete.  
The most prominent advocate of this thesis is Steven Pinker, 17  but 
others such as Joshua Goldstein and Christopher Fettweis focused on 
the dramatic reduction in the frequency of interstate war and the 
precipitous fall in the number of casualties of armed conflict. 18 Michael 
Mandelbaum and John Mueller went so far as to claim that major war 
between the Great Powers had become obsolete as a social 
phenomenon. 19  The explanations for this phenomenon are varied. For 
one thing, territorial conquest is no longer the basis of national wealth 
and access to raw materials is provided by global trade relationships. 
The creation of the United States established a body of international 
                                                          
15 Joseph S. Nye, “What New World Order,” Foreign Affairs, vol. 71, no.2(Spring 
1992), 87.  
16 John J. Mearsheimer, “Why We Will Soon Miss The Cold War,” The Atlantic Monthly 
Vol.266, no.2 (1990), 37. 
17 Steven Pinker, The Better Angels of Our Nature: The Decline of Violence In History 
And Its Causes (London: Penguin, 2011), 112. 
18 Joshua S. Goldstein, Winning the War on War: The Decline of Armed Conflict 
Worldwide (London: Dutton 2011), 24, Christopher J. Fettweis, C.J., Dangerous 
Times? The International Politics of Great Power Peace (Washington, DC: Georgetown 
University Press, 2011), 31. 
19 John Mueller, Retreat from Doomsday: The obsolescence of modern war (New York, 
NY: Basic Books, 1989); Michael Mandelbaum, “Is Major War Obsolete” Survival 
Vol.40, No.4 (1998), 20. 
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law that prohibited the changing of territorial boundaries by military 
force. Modern economies are based on intellectual property and not 
the possession of physical resources. At the same time, the norms that 
govern relations between states have developed substantially.20 War is 
no longer considered a natural and legitimate activity of states and 
only permissible under very restricted circumstances. The theory of the 
“democratic peace” according to which liberal democracies do not go 
to war with each is a further development of the notion of the impact 
of norms on the reduction of armed conflict. This concept has been 
contested, and the interpretation of the empirical evidence depends 
on the historical time period under consideration and the definition of 
the term “liberal democracy,” but it embodies the notion that the 
norms that have been internalized by the political elites in democratic 
states result in a fundamental restraint regarding the use of force and 
that liberal democratic states do not threaten each other to the extent 
that the military balance between them is not a relevant factor in 
determining their relations.  
But the acceptance of norms with respect to the use of force are 
not the unique property of liberal democratic states, as states with 
hybrid or authoritarian regimes also claim to adhere to international 
norms as codified in international law and in particular the UN Charter. 
Indeed, respect for international norms has become so universal that a 
special category – that of “rogue states” has been invented for states 
who are deemed to not generally conform to such norms, although this 
term and such designations are contested and generally not accepted 
                                                          
20 This is clearly the position of the US government even under the Trump 
administration, see Office of the Secretary of Defense,” Nuclear Posture Review 
2018,” Report-2018, 2; Available at: 
https://media.defense.gov/2018/Feb/02/2001872886/-1/-1/1/2018-NUCLEAR-
POSTURE-REVIEW-FINAL-REPORT.PDF (accessed on 2 February 2021). for an 
academic analysis see; Theo Farrell, The Norms of War (New Delhi: Viva Books Private 
Limited, 2006), 22. 
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in academic discourse.21 In modern economies, wealth no longer stems 
from the possession of territories, and natural resources can be 
obtained through trade, obviating the need for territorial conquest as 
globalization has created world-wide economic interdependencies. The 
argument according to which war is no longer in the national interest 
of major powers, is supplemented by a different line of reasoning that 
explains the change in the role of armed conflict in the international 
system. The work of Bruce Russett and Zeev Maoz has substantiated the 
relationship between political participation and normative constraints in 
liberal democracies and the occurrence of disputes that involve the threat 
or the use of armed force.22 This means that the sources of insecurity and 
the risk of conflict in the international system are not imbalances of 
power as posited by traditional realist theory. Instead, the sources of 
conflict are based on asymmetries of norms and therefore the higher 
the normative asymmetry, the greater the risk of armed conflict.  
The second nuclear age 
The role of nuclear weapons in the international system is evidently 
closely related to the role of armed force more generally. In the realist 
perspective on international relations, military power is the principal 
determinant of state power and the risk of armed conflict is related to 
the balance of military power. However, as has been explained in the 
previous section, it is not clear that this explains the contemporary 
international system in which the risk of armed conflict between states 
is low except in some specific crisis regions such as  South Asia  or  the 
21 K. P. O'Reilly, “Perceiving Rogue States: The Use of the "Rogue State" Concept by 
U.S. Foreign Policy Elites,” Foreign Policy Analysis, Vol. 3, no. 4(October 2007), 305. 
22 Robert Latham, “Democracy and War-Making: Locating the International Liberal 
Context,” Millennium, Vol.22, no.2 (1993), 142; Zeev Maoz and Bruce Russett, 
“Alliance, contiguity, wealth and political stability: Is the lack of conflict among 
democracies a statistical artefact?,” International Interactions, Vol.17, no.3 (1992), 267. 
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Korean peninsula.23 During the Cold War, nuclear weapons were central to 
the conflict between the Soviet Union/Warsaw Pact and the United 
States/NATO and the dominant factor in the military balance that involved 
a substantial strategic nuclear arsenal with a triad of international range 
delivery vehicles, preparations of large-scale conventional conflict in 
Europe supported by tactical nuclear forces and proxy conflicts out-of-
area. Although the United States and Russia still maintain substantial 
strategic nuclear forces, their role has changed fundamentally. As the 
prospect of large-scale warfare in Europe retreated, the United States 
developed effective global power projection capabilities based on 
conventional weapons while Russia’s conventional military capacity 
shrunk to the point that nuclear weapons were considered essential as a 
deterrent of last resort, as well as Russia’s only claim to be a Great Power.  
The first decade after the Cold War seemed to confirm the view 
that the military contingencies that the nuclear powers are likely to 
face do not involve nuclear weapons either as a deterrent or as a useful 
military tool. Indeed, for the first time in their history the countries of 
Western and Central Europe did not face an external enemy. For 
example, in the conflicts in the Balkans four nuclear powers were 
engaged with armed forces, but this had no relevance for their conduct 
or the course of the conflict. As very few states faced an external threat 
that would compel them to acquire nuclear weapons, all non-nuclear 
states joined the NPT albeit some exceptions.24  
                                                          
23 Brennen T. Fagan, Marina I. Knight, Niall J. MacKay and A. Jamie Wood, “Change 
point analysis of historical battle deaths,” Journal of the Royal Statistical Society: 
Series A (Statistics in Society) Vol. 183, no.3 (2020), 21; Thomas S. Szayna, Stephen 
Watts, Angela O’Mahony, Bryan Frederick and Jennifer Kavanagh, What Are the 
Trends in Armed Conflicts, and What Do They Mean for U.S. Defense Policy? (Santa 
Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2017), 3. 
24 Obvious exceptions are crisis regions such as South Asia and the Korean peninsula, 
and Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine bowed to pressure from the US and Russia to  
allow nuclear weapons on their territories to be removed in return for security 
assurances and financial incentives. 
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Another significant factor is the development and diffusion of norms 
which changes the way in which countries view nuclear weapons. In 
particular international norms in relation to the use of force have 
changed fundamentally since 1945. The use of force is generally 
justified either as strict self-defence or more generally on the grounds of 
national security concerns. Rather, the use of force is only permissible 
under very specific conditions, such as self-defence, or the enforcement 
of international law and security as mandated by the UN Security 
Council (which may include humanitarian intervention).25 Moreover, 
the use of force is subject to very stringent conditions, among which 
proportionality and the avoidance of civilian casualties are paramount.  
Although this is not necessarily accepted by nuclear states, it could 
be argued in conformity with the advisory opinion of the International 
Court of Justice that the use of nuclear weapons has to conform to the 
principles of international humanitarian law, which would mean that 
the use of nuclear weapons would be illegal in almost all conceivable 
circumstances.26 Although nuclear weapons states may not accept such 
restrictions, nevertheless, Nina Tannenwald has demonstrated the 
emergence of a “nuclear taboo,” a growing and powerful moral 
restraint on the use of nuclear weapons that has turned “the habit of 
non-use” into a form of required and expected behavior among 
states.27  It is true that Nina Tannenwald has more recently claimed 
that the nuclear taboo may have weakened by various developments.28 
                                                          
25 Simon Chesterman, Just War or Just Peace? Humanitarian Intervention and 
International Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 220; Adam Robert, 
Humanitarian Action in War (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), 7. 
26 International Court of justice, “Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons,” 
ICJ, Report-1996, Available at: https://www.icj-cij.org/public/files/case-
related/95/095-19960708-ADV-01-00-EN.pdf (accessed on 6 March 2021). 
27 Nina Tannenwald, The Nuclear Taboo (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2007), 29. 
28 Nina Tannenwald and James M. Acton, Meeting the Challenges of the New Nuclear 
Age: Emerging Risks and Declining Norms in the Age of Technological Innovation and 
Changing Nuclear Doctrines (Cambridge, MA: Academy of Arts & Sciences, 2018), 6. 
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These include nuclear modernization which threatens the second strike 
capabilities of nuclear powers, the development of conventional global 
strike capabilities, the increase deployment by Russia of sub strategic 
nuclear forces, the development of low yield nuclear weapons that 
allegedly lower the nuclear threshold, the emergence of small 
“undeterrable” nuclear states (so far only one, North Korea), the 
decline of arms control and the increasing emphasis on nuclear 
weapons in military doctrines of the Great Powers. This study argues 
that the opposite is the case and that these developments are 
misinterpreted. First of all, there is no evidence at all that the second-
strike capabilities of the major nuclear powers are weakening.  
The opposite is the case as the number of land-based missiles has 
been reduced and their capabilities are supplemented by much less 
vulnerable sea-based forces. The “window of vulnerability” is an even 
less plausible concept than it was in the time of Reagan. The increasing 
significance of conventional global strike capabilities, despite the 
confusion in the formal US nuclear posture, shows that there is a shift 
from nuclear to conventional capabilities for deterrence. Their purpose 
is not to facilitate the use of nuclear weapons, but to render it 
unnecessary. Nuclear doctrines and force postures are out of line with the 
actual military contingencies nuclear powers are facing. Low yield 
weapons have existed for decades, and even the new low-yield warhead 
for Trident would be a weapon of mass destruction killing in excess of 
100,000 people in any urban area. Although Russia has increased its 
reliance on non-strategic forces for deterrence, it is remarkable that 
the United States has not followed suit. It is the argument developed in 
this study that the assertion that the risks of nuclear war are increasing 
is not supported by the evidence. It remains the case that in contrast to 
nuclear deterrence, the option of actual nuclear use is reserved for the 
highest level of escalation in a conflict in a situation where all other 
efforts at escalation control have failed. In other words, it would 
assume a massive high intensity conventional conflict that puts the 
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national survival of the nuclear power at risk. However, there is no 
theatre of conflict in which such a scenario is even a remote prospect 
in terms of relations between the Great Powers. It is true that relations 
between the Great Powers have become more conflictual and that 
military threats have re-emerged in Eastern Europe and the Far East. 
These will be discussed in more detail subsequently. Nuclear 
deterrence is a function of the credibility of a threat and the capability to 
carry it out. The latter remains, but the former has clearly diminished in 
terms of regional conflict involving the Great Powers. The only 
explanation for this phenomenon is that the Great Powers consider the 
use of nuclear weapons less likely and that the role of nuclear weapons 
in international security has diminished. This argument will be 
considered in more detail in the succeeding discussion. 
Although one may question how strictly international norms are 
being adhered to, they demonstrably restrain the use of force by 
states. Indeed, Theo Farrell in his path-breaking study of the norms of 
war, stated: “Most of the time states obey international law, and they 
do so for any one of a number of reasons: because they think it is 
advantageous, appropriate, and/or fair to do so. Crucially, in terms of 
showing the autonomous causal effect of legal norms, states will obey 
international law even when it goes against their self-interests.”29 
Many former practices in the conduct of warfare are no longer 
acceptable, such as the annexation of foreign territories or the 
execution of prisoners of war, and there is generally condemnation of 
military actions that are not precisely targeted to avoid civilian 
casualties.30  
                                                          
29 Theo Farrell, The Norms of War (New Delhi: Viva Books Private Limited, 2006),163. 
30 Christoph Bluth, Britain, Germany and Western Nuclear Strategy (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1995), 30; Christoph Bluth, Shadows of War (London: Global 
Research Publications, 2020), 21. 
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The changes in the European security environment after the collapse of 
the Cold War system manifested itself in the steady decline of defence 
spending as a proportion of GDP by the NATO countries for example.31 
The major risk to international security in the time following the post-
Cold war period appeared to reside in the so-called new wars, sub-
state conflicts that arise from ethnic disputes, or failed states in regions 
of low development.32  For the vast majority of states, there is no 
significant risk of war. This is a situation unprecedented in human 
history since the advent of the Westphalian system of states. 
 
The US-Russian strategic relationship and the role of nuclear 
deterrence 
The early period in US-Russian relations after the Cold War were 
characterized by an effort to develop a non-adversarial relationship in 
which the United States and Russia were partners to manage the 
transition to cooperative security in Europe and a new stable nuclear 
order.33 The dissolution of the Soviet Union had precipitated a collapse 
of Soviet military power and the withdrawal of troops from Eastern and 
Central Europe was in progress, with the last Russian troops leaving 
Germany in 1994.34 Just at the end of the Soviet period the START 1 
Treaty had been concluded which envisaged a reduction of deployed 
warheads by about 37% on both sides. The United States and Russia 
used the START Treaty as an instrument of non-proliferation to 
                                                          
31 “Financial and Economic Data Relating to NATO Defence,” NATO OTAN, February 
24, 2014, Available at: https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_107359.htm 
(accessed on 10 March 2021); Javier Solana, "NATO and European Security into the 
21st Century,” NATO OTAN, May 13, 1998, Speech, published 13 May 1998, Available 
at: https://www.nato.int/cps/en/SID-85AC8871-
0CFB0FBA/natolive/opinions_26116.htm (accessed on 24 March 2021). 
32 Mary Kaldor, Old Wars and New War: Organised Violence in a New Era (Stanford 
CA: Stanford University Press, 2007), 2. 
33 Sergei A. Karaganov, Russia: The New Foreign Policy and Security Agenda (London: 
Brassey’s, 1992), 42. 
34 Pavel K. Baev, The Russian Army In a Time of Troubles (London: Sage, 1996), 103. 
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persuade Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Belarus to give up the strategic 
nuclear forces based on their territories.35 After the 1993 coup which 
was put down with an attack on the White House in Moscow where 
the Duma was held Yeltsin had to contend with the conservative forces 
in Russia that continued to perceive the relationship between Russia 
and the West as adversarial. In this context the continued existence of 
NATO was interpreted to mean that the West continued to threaten 
Russia, while the Western attitude was that as Russia and the West 
were no longer adversaries NATO should not be perceived as 
threatening.  
The enlargement of NATO was motivated by a desire to integrate 
the Central European states politically into the West rather than 
develop a military threat to Russia. Although such integration would 
have made more sense through EU membership, the Central European 
states were not politically or economically ready for EU membership 
then and West European leaders did not consider it prudent to wait 
until they could join the EU which did not occur before 2004. NATO 
enlargement was vigorously opposed by Russia as a violation of 
previous commitments given by the G.H.W. Bush administration that it 
had “no need, no plans, no intention” to expand NATO membership to 
former WTO States and taken as evidence of the West’s hostility. 36 The 
NATO-Russia Founding Act created a new consultative mechanism to 
allay Russian fears, but in time Russia’s focus on NATO as a threat 
                                                          
35 “The START Treaty,” The Library of Congress, 1992, Available at: 
https://www.loc.gov/law/find/nominations/gates/0001242677a_excerpt.pdf 
(accessed on 12 March 2021). 
36 James B. Steinberg and Philip H. Gordon, “NATO Enlargement: Moving Forward; 
Expanding the Alliance and Completing Europe’s Integration  by Thursday,” Brookings 
Institution , November 15, 2001, Available at:  
https://www.brookings.edu/research/nato-enlargement-moving-forward-expanding-
the-alliance-and-completing-europes-integration/  (accessed on 15 March 2021). 
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resumed.37 The START II Treaty had the purpose of dramatically 
reducing the nuclear arsenals of the United States and Russia. By 
banning land-based ICBMs with multiple warheads, it would stabilise 
the strategic relationship as the threat of a first strike would now be 
considerably reduced, as well as ending Russia’s dependence on missile 
factories based in Ukraine. START II was ratified by the US Senate on 26 
January 1996 with a vote of 87–4.  
However, the treaty became a victim of the internal battle in Russia 
over policy towards the West and was not ratified until Putin assumed 
the presidency. Even then it was not implemented, but was instead 
replaced by the Moscow Treaty (SORT) that permitted three warheads 
to be carried by each ICBM, but abandoned the verification measures 
that had been in place for START.38 The Obama administration 
returned to more traditional strategic arms control negotiations that 
resulted in the New START Treaty which was recently renewed by the 
Biden administration.39 The Trump administration’s 2018 Nuclear 
Posture Review (NPR) followed the general outlines of the Obama 
administration to modernize the nuclear weapons arsenal. But, as the 
Bulletin of Atomic Scientists reported, “it includes several important 
changes. The most significant change is a recommendation to increase 
the types and role of US nuclear weapons. The Trump NPR takes a 
confrontational tone, presenting an assertive posture that embraces 
37 Roy Allison and Christoph Bluth, eds., Security Dilemmas in Russia and Eurasia 
(London: RIIA/Brookings, 1998), 301. 
38 “The Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT) At a Glance,” Armscontrol.org, 
September 2017, Available at: https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/sort-glance 
(accessed on 15 March 2021). 
39 “Treaty Between The United States Of America And The Russian Federation On 
Measures For The Further Reduction And Limitation Of Strategic Offensive Arms,” 
NTI, February 25, 2021, Available at: https://www.nti.org/learn/treaties-and-
regimes/treaty-between-the-united-states-of-america-and-the-russian-federation-
on-measures-for-the-further-reduction-and-limitation-of-strategic-offensive-arms/ 
(accessed on 26 March 2021); “United States extends nuclear treaty with Russia for 
five years,” Washington Post,  February 3, 2021. 
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“Great Power competition,” and includes plans to develop new nuclear 
weapons and modify others. The report backs away from the goal of 
seeking to limit the role of nuclear weapons to the sole purpose of 
deterring nuclear attacks, and instead emphasizes “expanding” US 
nuclear options to deter, and, if deterrence fails, to prevail against both 
nuclear and “non-nuclear strategic attacks.” To be clear, any use of a 
nuclear weapon to respond to a non-nuclear strategic attack would 
constitute nuclear first use. 
Thus, the NPR states that “non-nuclear strategic attacks include, 
but are not limited to, attacks on the US, allied, or partner civilian 
population or infrastructure, and attacks on the US or allied nuclear 
forces, their command and control, or warning and attack assessment 
capabilities.”40 The purpose of nuclear forces will be to “hedge against 
the potential rapid growth or emergence of nuclear and non-nuclear 
strategic threats, including chemical, biological, cyber, and large-scale 
conventional aggression” 41.. ..  “The United States will enhance the 
flexibility and range of its tailored deterrence options. … Expanding 
flexible US nuclear options now, to include low-yield options, is 
important for the preservation of credible deterrence against regional 
aggression….” 42  These statements in the NPR cover a full range of 
possible threat scenarios and have been taken to extend the role of 
nuclear deterrence and potentially the use of US nuclear forces. The 
ambiguous attitude of the Trump administration to arms control fits in 
with its nuclear policy. Russian violations of the INF Treaty were used 
to abandon the treaty regime altogether and right to the end the 
40 Office of Secretary of Defence, “Nuclear Posture Review 2018,”US Department of 
Defence, Report-2018, Available at: 
https://media.defense.gov/2018/Feb/02/2001872886/-1/-1/1/2018-NUCLEAR-
POSTURE-REVIEW-FINAL-REPORT.PDF (accessed on 20 March 2021). 
41 Ibid, 38. 
42 Ibid, 34. 
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Trump administration remained hesitant about renewing or 
renegotiating the START Treaty that Trump always said he disliked.  
There are three important reasons to believe that the statements in 
the NPR are overinterpreted. The first is that US nuclear weapons are 
not deterring chemical, biological or cyber aggression, nor are they 
appropriate instruments to deter or respond to it. In fact, the NPR itself 
affirms that “The United States would only consider the use of nuclear 
weapons in extreme circumstances to defend the vital interest of the 
United States, its allies, and partners.” 43 The basis of nuclear 
deterrence is the credible threat to use nuclear weapons, and it is 
simply not credible to use nuclear weapons against anything other than 
existential threats. The second is that while the Trump administration 
put great store in maintaining and building military capabilities, issued 
various military threats and resisted Congressional efforts to institute 
constraints based on the War Powers Act, it was exceedingly reluctant 
to actually use them. Trump increased the troop levels in Afghanistan 
but then moved towards complete withdrawal despite a deteriorating 
security situation and now the Biden administration has announced 
that the United States will withdraw. The Trump administration 
continued that campaign against ISIS initiated by the Obama 
administration, but withdrew most forces from Syria as soon as all 
territory was recovered, abandoning its Kurdish allies in the process. 
When faced with the prospect of launching military strikes against Iran, 
Trump demurred and decided not to act.44 Moreover, Trump 
persistently challenged the existing alliance security structures in 
Europe and the Far East. Despite his rhetoric, Trump appeared to be 
unwilling to initiate military action against North Korea or defend 
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Taiwan in the event of a conflict.45 Indeed, prior to leaving office Trump 
initiated action to withdraw all US forces from all its overseas basis, an 
action which he was unable to complete.46 But the reluctance to 
deploy and use US forces abroad is increasing after Trump, while the 
risks of a large-scale conventional attack on US territory are extremely 
low. Another way of expressing this is that the major powers are 
deterred from escalating any military conflict beyond a sub 
conventional level. The actual use of nuclear weapons remains 
extremely unlikely because the hierarchy of military conflict has not 
changed, and nuclear weapons remain at the upper level of escalation. 
The third reason is that it is to be expected that the Biden 
administration will revise US nuclear doctrine again and move away 
from the more contentious aspects of NPR 2018 as it moved quickly to 
renew START for another five years. 
Russian strategic arms policy has been characterized by substantial 
overall reductions as codified in arms control agreements with the 
United States (albeit still maintaining a very substantial force) and 
incremental modernization. The primary purpose of Russia’s strategic 
nuclear forces remains the maintenance of an effective counter to US 
strategic forces as Russia, contrary to some of the rhetoric, is not likely 
to be involved in any armed conflict in which it is necessary to deter 
the threat of large-scale military attacks with nuclear forces. Thus, the 
official US government threat assessment focuses on Russian 
“influence campaigns, intelligence and counterterrorism cooperation, 
military aid and combined exercises, mercenary operations, 
assassinations, and arms sales—to advance its interests or undermine 
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the interests of the United States and its allies” and accepts that the 
purpose of nuclear forces is to deter attacks on Russia itself. It also 
considers large-scale military operations far outside Russia to be 
unlikely.47 It states: “We expect Moscow to insert itself into crises 
when Russian interests are at stake, it can turn a power vacuum into an 
opportunity, or the anticipated costs of action are low.” The nuclear 
strategic relationship between Russia and the United States is stable, 
and despite the controversies over the issue of ballistic missile defence 
neither side can credibly destroy the second-strike capability of the 
other sufficiently. Although Russia was explicitly excluded as a target of 
national missile defence on the grounds (as articulated by President 
GW Bush) that Russia was no longer an enemy, Russian military 
planners have remained nervous about new capabilities that might 
degrade their offensive strike capabilities.  
This has manifested itself in Russian opposition to European based 
missile defence installations directed against a possible missile attack 
from Iran.48 The European Phased Adapted Approach includes the 
deployment of the Aegis Ashore Missile Defence System whose 
purpose is to defend European states against long-range missile attacks 
from smaller states such as Iran and the United States has stated that 
the Russian Federation cannot be targeted by the system deployed in 
Romania. The Russians have claimed that the MK-41 VLS system 
enables Aegis Ashore to launch ground-based cruise missiles in the 
contravention of the INF Treaty. The Russian stance to portray the 
Aegis off-shore and onshore systems as offensive threats was 
                                                          
47 Office of the Director of National Intelligence, Annual Threat Assessment of the US 
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vigorously rejected by the United States.49 The competing claims 
regarding offensive capabilities that allegedly violated the INF Treaty 
resulted in the decision by the Trump administration to withdraw from 
the treaty in response to the SSC-8 cruise missile, which according to 
the US has a range of 3,000 km and violates the INF Treaty although 
this claim is rejected by Russia. However, the United States has no 
plans for new INF deployments in Europe despite the end of the INF 
Treaty.50  The deployment of US missile defences in Europe is given as 
the rationale for the deployment of strategic bombers in Crimea and 
the introduction of hypersonic missiles. Although hypersonic missiles 
which contrary to various declarations cannot yet be deemed to be 
operational are an important new technical development, do not 
fundamentally alter the strategic balance between the United States 
and Russia as missiles armed with the new re-entry vehicle are 
included in the START limits. 51 Although Russia has substantially 
modernized its strategic nuclear forces to ensure a substantial strike 
capability by all legs of its strategic triad and has narrowed the 
technological gap with the United States, neither side has the capacity 
to execute a first strike that would prevent the other side from 
launching a massive counterstrike and so a very high degree of mutual 
vulnerability persists.52 
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While the nuclear strategic relationship remains stable, Russia has over 
the last decade revitalized its conventional capabilities and has more 
recently exhibited a more assertive posture with respect to the use of 
force.53 In particular, Russia has now become very assertive in terms of 
reasserting its dominance in the former Soviet space.54 The recent 
Russian military interventions in Georgia and Ukraine and the 
annexation of Crimea is viewed by some scholars as the beginning of a 
revival of the nuclear threat in global security as Russia has hinted that 
the in the event of a NATO military intervention the use of tactical 
nuclear weapons might be possible. This is underscored by the risks 
taken by Russia in its “hybrid warfare” to support its sphere of 
influence despite its relative weakness in conventional capabilities vis-
à-vis NATO.55  
However, the conclusions drawn from these cases may be 
exaggerated. The Georgia case is complex with evidence that Georgia 
itself provoked Russian retaliation so that Tbilisi could push for NATO 
membership and that then-President Mikheil Saakashvili played his 
cards badly. How significant the nuclear threat is, remains to be seen 
however given that NATO also has nuclear capabilities, and the US has 
strategic nuclear capabilities that are more than a match for those of 
Russia. So far, a revival of the military confrontation in Europe or the 
strategic nuclear stand-off between the US and Russia is not on the 
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horizon.56  Although Russia and the US have been engaging in 
dangerous military activities that increase the risk of accidental 
interaction between military forces in the air and on the sea, the forces 
for a large-scale conventional conflict are not in place nor would the 
strategic objectives of such a conflict be apparent. Moreover, this 
situation has not significantly affected the pattern of global security. It 
is not clear whether “hybrid warfare,” which is a sub conventional 
conflict that uses low levels of disguised forces as well as non-military 
means such as cyber-attacks and information warfare, relies on nuclear 
deterrence or not. As with hybrid warfare, Russia has been using 
subversion rather than a conventional military engagement against 
potential targets in Eastern Europe,57  the means to combat it also 
need to be “hybrid” by countering information warfare as well as 
support for sub conventional combat. It is highly unlikely that the US 
would become militarily involved in the conflict in Ukraine even if 
Russia had no nuclear weapons.  
Indeed, Ukraine is using weapons provided by the United States to 
combat Russian forces and proxies without any regard to Russia’s 
nuclear weapons. For now, it seems that nuclear deterrence is not a 
significant factor in the conflict itself, even though Ukraine is now 
regretting giving up the nuclear forces on its territory (even though it 
was unable to manage a nuclear weapons complex at that time) and is 
contemplating a nuclear revival. However, from a strategic perspective 
it seems clear that Russia has become much less risk-averse since 
2014.58 Despite the improvements in Russian conventional military 
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capabilities since their low point in the 1990s, Russian forces are, if the 
claims of Russian analysts are to be believed, still relatively weak and 
technologically inferior to NATO forces especially if one takes into 
account potential reinforcements from the United States to the 
existing peace-time deployments, despite efforts in recent year to 
modernize and upgrade capabilities.59 The likely explanation that is the 
continued reliance of Russia’s large nuclear capabilities which include 
substantial non-strategic assets as well as calculations about the 
reluctance of NATO to commit forces to the defence of non-member.  
Contemporary security challenges in Northeast Asia 
In Northeast Asia, China’s position at the end of the Cold War was 
undergoing dramatic change since it had opened up to international 
trade and focused on economic development and modernization. The 
dissolution of the Soviet Union and the withdrawal of Russia from its 
previous global commitments resulted in a fundamental 
transformation of Sino-Russian relations from an adversarial 
relationship to a strategic partnership. With the disappearance of the 
Soviet threat, Russia’s role in the security of Northeast Asia diminished 
significantly. China was improving its relations not only with Russia, but 
South East Asian countries and it initiated diplomatic relations with the 
Republic of Korea. Even relations between the PRC and Taiwan became 
less belligerent. The main countervailing trend was on the Korean 
peninsula, where the end of the Cold War and the loss of the lifelines 
from Russia and to some extent China precipitated an existential crisis 
in North Korea that resulted in the collapse of the planned economy, a 
famine that killed over a million people and almost ended the Kim 
regime. At the same time the North Korean nuclear program 
precipitated a major crisis that very nearly resulted in a military conflict 
with the United States. The crisis on the Korean peninsula, alongside 
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with the enduring US-Japanese alliance and the security assurances to 
Taiwan perpetuated the American military presence in the Asia-Pacific 
region. 
The continuing economic growth and modernization of China as 
well as rise of regionalism in East Asia, the persistent conflict with the 
DPRK redefined the geopolitics of the region. With the slogan of the 
“peaceful rise of China,” the accession to the NPT and the cessation of 
nuclear testing, its efforts to come in line with concerns about the 
exports of dual-use nuclear and missile technology China made an 
effort to appear as a “good international citizen” and allay the fears in 
the United States and in the region about its growing political and 
economic power.60 Although China as one of the P5 on the UN Security 
Council has a major voice in global security, Beijing has been reluctant 
to assume any wider international responsibilities and has so far 
exercised its influence through occasional vetoes, while mostly 
abstaining on controversial resolutions.  
Under Xi Jinping China clearly perceives itself as a major power in 
the region and increasingly as a global power on a par with the United 
States, set to eclipse the United States by 2049. However, although 
there is a dense network of trade and economic relations involving 
China, other regional players are not prepared to accept China as a 
leader in regional security. Indeed, China’s aggressive pursuit of 
territorial disputes in the South China Sea and the Sea of Japan has 
tarnished its image and generated serious concerns about the future 
rise of China and the impact on the geopolitics of the region.61 
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Although China has shown signs of moderating its approach to this 
issue it remains a major source of tension in the region.62 
From the US perspective, the sources of tension in East Asia are not 
only about divergent national interests. As James Steinberg, Obama’s 
former Deputy Secretary of State has pointed out, they are also about 
values. Steinberg and O’Hanlon describe the view of those who see 
values as central to relations with China as follows: “The values debate 
is not wholly independent from security concerns…the autocratic 
nature of the Communist Party means that China’s policy will 
necessarily be hostile to the United States… From this perspective, 
actively supporting democratic change and human rights not only is 
consistent with US values but also can bring about the ‘peaceful 
evolution’ of the Chinese political system that would make China’s rise 
less threatening.”63 In 2011 the then US Secretary of State Hillary 
Clinton published an article in Foreign Policy entitled “The Pacific 
Century” that set out some of the thinking underlying what came to be 
known as the “US pivot” to the Asia Pacific region.64 It was based on 
the recognition that in economic, political and security terms East Asia 
is becoming the most important region in the world. The pivot was 
based on six pillars. The first priority was to strengthen the alliances of 
the US in the region. Although the alliance with Japan has come under 
strain it is fundamentally intact after the resolution of the issue of the 
American bases on Okinawa and in other parts of Japan. The alliance 
transcends party politics in Japan and in the view of the White House 
works well on day-to-day issues. The alliance with the Republic of 
62 Anders Corr, Great Powers, Grand Strategies – The New Game in the South China 
Sea (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2017), 247; David Shambaugh, Where 
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Korea remains strong as the disagreements that marked the Roh 
administration have been resolved and the Moon administration 
worked closely with the US government to coordinate policy towards 
North Korea. 65 
The pivot is also articulated as an act of “economic statecraft.” The 
objective is to put in place a political and international regulatory 
environment that will enable the development of closer business ties 
across the Pacific. The focus has been on promoting Asia-Pacific 
economic integration and free trade agreements such as the US-Korea 
FTA and the Trans-Pacific Partnership, although the latter was 
abandoned by President Trump. The second pillar of the pivot is 
deepening working relationships with emerging powers, including 
China, and the third pillar of the pivot is US engagement with 
multilateral institutions, in particular ASEAN and the East Asia Summit. 
The fourth pillar is expanding trade and investment, the fifth pillar 
forging a broad-based military presence and the sixth pillar is the 
support or universal values which include human rights.66 This issue is a 
particular source of friction in US-China relations and Chinese 
policymakers see diplomatic engagement on human rights as 
interference in China’s internal affairs, while interpreting US political 
and military actions is based on US strategic interests rather than the 
promotion of values and the international order. The effort to 
downplay the significance of the military element of the pivot has had 
the opposite of the intended effect. On the one hand both allies and 
others in the region were underwhelmed by the apparent weakness of 
                                                          
65 “DCPD-201800361 - Remarks Prior to a Meeting With President Moon Jae-in of 
South Korea and an Exchange With Reporters in New York city,” govinfo, May 22, 
2018, Available at: https://www.govinfo.gov/app/details/DCPD-201900650 (accessed 
on 2 March 2021); “100 Policy Tasks Five-year Plan of the Moon Jae-in 
Administration,” Korean Culture and Information Service, August 17, 2017, Available 
at: https://english1.president.go.kr/dn/5af107425ff0d (accessed on 14 March 2021). 
66 David J. Bertau, Michael J. Green, Zack Cooper, Assessing the Asia-Pacific Rebalance 
(Washington, DC: CSIS, 2014), 4. 
Global Security in the Post-Cold War Era and the Relevance of Nuclear Weapons 
95 
the military aspect of the pivot. On the other hand, it has provoked a 
much more assertive stance by China, which is precisely what the 
Obama administration intended to avoid.   
In addition to the continuing pursuit of territorial claims in the 
maritime regions, China has effectively abolished the special status of 
Hong Kong in a firm response to political protests and continues to 
signal the preparedness to use force against Taiwan. As a consequence, 
South Korea and Japan have become even more reliant on the United 
States to counterbalance China’s growing power. The “one belt one 
road” initiative developed by President Xi Jinping as an ambitious 
economic development and commercial project designed to improve 
connectivity and cooperation among many countries across Asia, 
Africa, and Europe has become the platform for China to take a leading 
role in the ordering of the international system as a leading power in a 
multipolar world.67  
The emerging challenge of the Chinese navy is part of a longer-term 
effort to displace the United States as the dominant military power in 
the Pacific.68 Despite various speculations to the contrary, the 
immediate challenge is not one of direct military conflict as such a 
conflict (say over Taiwan or the maritime territorial claims). Although 
China’s naval patrols, the declarations of air control zones extended far 
beyond China’s territorial boundaries and the penetration of Taiwan’s 
air space with advanced aircraft have been viewed as a greater 
willingness to deploy and threaten military power, this does not mean 
that China intends to initiate armed hostilities and China is not alone in 
67 Eyck Freymann, One Belt One Road (Cambridge. MA: Harvard University Press, 
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defining an expansive Air Defence Identification Zone (ADIZ) which can 
extend to 200 km or more. Such a conflict would have serious 
consequences for both sides, especially in view of China’s dependence 
on continuing economic growth and the economic interdependence of 
China and the United States. The strategic concerns arise from the way 
in which the perception of China’s military capabilities both in 
Washington and in the region will alter the behavior of political actors 
and impact on the evolution of the geopolitics of the region. The on-
going conflict involving China and South East Asian countries over the 
maritime and exclusive economic zone claims have resulted in 
inconsistent responses from South East Asian countries due to their 
economic interests in harmonious relations with China and their 
military weakness. Efforts to get a coherent response from ASEAN has 
failed for this reason.69 If tensions over these issues rise, there is the 
other possibility that the United States could become drawn into a 
serious conflict between China and another country in the region. The 
United States has sent patrols into the disputed areas in order to re-
assert the principle of freedom of navigation, which elicited sharp 
protests from China, but there remains a level of restraint on both 
sides. But the strategic risk is that China will be able to change the 
status quo in the region incrementally without provoking a war. Not 
only would China be rewarded for an aggressive expansion of its 
control over the maritime region, but this has the potential of creating 
a new strategic status quo in which China has created a maritime 
buffer zone from which the US navy is excluded. The Trump 
administration focused on trade relations with China and had little 
interest in regional security (except for North Korea) or support for 
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human rights despite various statements critical of China’s human 
rights record, especially in Hong Kong.70 
China’s military modernization is designed to enable China to 
support what it has defined to be its core interests.71 The larger 
geopolitical goals are to support China’s role as a major power in the 
region and the displacement of American influence. In strategic terms, 
the highest priority are relations with Taiwan. Although China is 
pursuing its relations with Taiwan in anticipation of a peaceful 
reunification at some time in the future, it reserves the military option 
in case it is deemed necessary. A similarly high priority is 
defense/denial of access to the American navy to Chinese controlled 
waters. This includes the capacity to support China’s territorial claims 
in the East China Sea and the South China Sea and its claim (not 
accepted by the international community) that it can regulate foreign 
military activities in what it claims to be its 200-mile maritime exclusive 
economic zone.  
The United States remains the dominant military power in the 
region. Although eventually China’s military capabilities could approach 
those of the United States, this is unlikely to occur for several decades 
given the advantages the United States has in military technology, 
global power projection capabilities and together with its allies the 
United States currently accounts for 70% of global defense. The Trump 
administration strongly committed to expanding US military 
capabilities at all levels including the wholesale modernization of 
strategic nuclear forces (although casting doubt on its commitment to 
actually honor its commitments to allies) and the Biden administration 
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is likewise proposing continued high levels of defense spending. The 
United States is not only significantly ahead of China in military 
technology but given the continuing disparity in military spending and 
the unrivalled R&D infrastructure, the technological dynamism of the 
US and the existing stock of high-technology military hardware, a 
significant gap between the US and China remains for now despite 
Department of Defense concerns about Chinese growing capabilities.72 
There are some specific issues that have been raised in relation to 
the concerns about the reduction in the qualitative edge of US military 
superiority. One is the prospect that China might use intermediate 
range ballistic missiles to target US aircraft carriers. The missile in 
question is the DF-21D, a variant of the road mobile DF-21 with a solid 
propellant motor armed with a 250 kt nuclear warhead. The DF-21D is 
to be used with conventional warheads, launched against surface ships 
from land. US estimates give the missile a range from 1,550 to 2,000 
km (Chinese reports claim a range of 2,700 km). The accuracy of the 
missile is estimated at 700 m (circular error probable).73 The extent to 
which it represents a realistic threat is doubtful, especially given that 
an attack by such missiles against a US carrier group would represent a 
very significant escalation that would raise the armed conflict to a 
wholly different level. The United States has very significant defensive 
capabilities for attacks against ships as well as tactical ballistic missile 
defenses. Military planners would assume that they only come into 
play once some level of direct hostilities had already been initiated.74 
Another issue that has been debated in the literature is the 
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quantitative advantage China has in attack submarines in the region 
and the China is now deploying more ships overall than the US navy, 
although these metrics are not defining the military balance per se and 
are rightly considered to be misleading.75  
Discussions of the regional military balance need to consider the 
fact that both the United States and China are nuclear powers. Neither 
China nor the United States have made explicit statements about 
nuclear deterrence in a potential conflict over Taiwan or the South 
China Sea.76   Estimates of China’s nuclear capabilities vary to some 
extent, but it is generally agreed that China's stockpile includes about 
270 operational warheads and is going to increase in the foreseeable 
future to about 350 warheads. Even if the stockpile increases further 
over the next ten years it will remain substantially smaller than that of 
Russia or the United States. One important indicator in any 
confrontation with the United States would be the capability of 
Chinese ICBMs to target the continental United States. The US 
Department of Defense estimates that China has deployed about 100 
Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs). Independent experts 
suggests that there are currently about 78 launchers deployed of the 
three (Dongfeng) DF-31 versions which can reach parts of Alaska and 
the Western continental United States. In addition, there are 10 each 
of the more modern DF-5A and DF-5B, while the new DF-41 ICBM is 
believed to be not yet operational.  
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The DF-5B may have multiple independently-retargetable re-entry 
vehicles (MIRVs) with five warheads each. China is developing and 
deploying precision strike nuclear delivery systems which may mean 
that China is moving to the adoption of a limited “high alert duty” 
strategy to permit some launch-on warning. Overall, China has a 
modest capability to strike the United States and most of its nuclear 
weapons are based on medium range ballistic missile that can strike 
parts of Russia or other regional targets.  The PLA is developing 
precision strike nuclear delivery systems such as the dual use DF-26 
intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM) and survivable road-mobile 
ICBMs with the CSS-10 mod 2 (DF-31A) class missile capable of striking 
locations within the continental United States. There has been some 
discussion that suggests China has moved a portion of its nuclear force 
to a Launch on Warning (LOW) posture and is adopting a limited “high 
alert duty” strategy. However, the requirements for a true LOW 
strategy are extremely demanding in terms of reconnaissance, early 
warning and command and control systems and is problematic in the 
context of an asymmetry of capabilities because LOW may invite 
further retaliatory strikes against China. The evidence so far suggests 
that there are discussions on this in the PLA and so far, there is no 
implementation of an LOW posture.77 There is clearly a substantial 
imbalance, as the United States has a stockpile of 3,800 nuclear 
warheads (not counting those slated for dismantlement), fields 404 
Minuteman ICBMs with three warheads each and together with 
submarine launched missiles and heavy bombers has deployed an 
intercontinental strategic arsenal of 1,365 nuclear warheads.78  
Any possible theatre of war between China and the United States 
differs from the Cold War example of Central Europe in so far as there 
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is no actual territory for the deployment of large-scale conventional 
forces. Any military operations would be carried out by naval forces 
unless China invaded Taiwan. Using nuclear weapons against naval 
targets is not appropriate to the targets and involves an unnecessary 
risk of escalation. Likewise, the use of nuclear weapons against Taiwan 
would be problematic because China considers the population of 
Taiwan to be their own citizens and therefore would essentially kill 
millions of their own people. Although the United States is committed 
to the security of Taiwan, there is no nuclear guarantee, and the United 
States has not deployed nuclear weapons anywhere on land in the 
region. Moreover, the United States has not deployed on ground forces 
in Taiwan. This means that the use of tactical nuclear forces is not 
plausible from a military perspective. Overall, the analysis of regional 
security does not indicate that nuclear deterrence is sufficient to 
prevent low-level military conflict, although it would limit escalation to 
attacks on Chinese territory. For China and the United States, nuclear 
weapons are deterrents of last resort. Given the strategic balance, 
China could not contemplate nuclear escalation unless there is a major 
attack on the Chinese mainland which is highly unlikely. Likewise, the 
United States is protecting strategic interests that are far from the 
homeland, which puts a limit on the risks it may be willing to take in 
their defence.79  
Conclusion 
The dominant discourse in Russia and China about relations between 
the Great Powers in the contemporary system of global security is of a 
“multipolar order” defined by the UN Charter and international law. By 
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contrast the United States government in the time of Biden 
administration has focused on a norm based international order, in 
which the United States would engage with other countries to stabilize 
the global economy and defend democracy against authoritarianism 
but without the use of military interventions. China and Russia reject 
this formulation and champion international law and the principles of 
the UN Charter, using these principles to defend national sovereignty 
and non-interference in internal affairs. The principal sources of 
conflict that could give rise to armed conflict are US opposition to 
China’s efforts to extend control over its neighborhood with the use of 
political, economic, and military instruments, in particular in relation to 
the maritime territories adjacent to China and Taiwan. In the case of 
Russia, it is the effort to extend hegemony over the former Soviet 
space that is the main source of conflict which involves the use of force 
in campaigns of hybrid warfare. From the US perspective, and contrary 
to the classic realist approach which sees the asymmetry of power as 
the primary source of armed conflict, it is the asymmetry of norms that 
gives rise to threats of armed conflict. In this framework of a norms 
based international system, the concept of “multipolarity” has no place 
because it involves by definition the exercise of power by states over 
other states which violates the basic principles of a norms based 
international system.80 These competing interpretations of the 
structure of the international system and the sources of armed conflict 
are not going to be resolved very soon, because in all three cases they 
form part of the defining identity and the core interests as defined by 
the current power elites.  However, this does not mean that the world 
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is returning to a strategic nuclear confrontation or the imminent threat 
of a high-intensity armed conflict between the Great Powers. 
The literature is currently dominated by the contrary view, namely 
that the risk of nuclear war is increasing. This is based on the 
observation that political relations among the major powers have 
become more confrontational, that nuclear weapons have been “re-
legitimized” and that new technologies could impact on strategic 
stability and deterrence. This study has argued that while the first of 
these contentions is undoubtedly true, the conclusions drawn are 
unwarranted. Even if all of the novel technologies to deliver nuclear 
weapons realize their potential, none of the major nuclear powers will 
acquire the capacity to eliminate substantial second-strike capabilities 
of the other parties. The threats to strategic stability are exaggerated. 
The increasing capacity to conduct precision nuclear strikes has not 
increased the likelihood of nuclear use because it is also being acquired 
by the adversaries of the United States, thereby increasing the risks 
associated with nuclear strikes for all involved. Although the rhetoric of 
political and military establishments has re-emphasized nuclear 
capabilities, this does not mean nuclear weapons have become more 
“legitimate,” as evidenced by the support for the Treaty on the 
Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (rejected by the nuclear powers). 
More important even for this argument is that despite the rhetoric, 
nuclear weapons have not acquired greater military utility. Missions 
previously assigned to nuclear weapons can now be performed by 
conventional weapons. This study has emphasized that even high 
intensity conventional warfare on a large scale remains a very unlikely 
scenario and the forces for such a confrontation are not in place either 
in Europe or the Far East.  The changed security environment may 
mean that nuclear weapons are insufficient to deter sub conventional 
war. This is another indicator that their use has become less rather 
than more plausible. However, the behavior of nuclear powers leads to 
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the conclusion that they can still deter major conventional war that 
could escalate to nuclear war. Nuclear weapons are used for 
deterrence or as a weapon of last resort to defend against an 
overwhelming threat to national survival. In the absence of a realistic 
conventional threat to the national survival of either Russia, China, or 
the United States, deterrence remains the only plausible role for 
nuclear arsenals.  
